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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE
Jess Spirer
"It is a fundamental principle of the criminal law that every"
crime, either common law or statutory, with the exception of public
nuisances and breaches of what are commonly called police regulations, includes a mental element. ' 2 We know this mental element
by diverse names,-mens rea, criminal intent, vicious will, guilty
mind, and so forth-but its most important characteristic is a
wilfulness to commit the crime or act in question. And when this
wilfulness or volition is actually or constructively absent, there is
generally no crime.
Of the several conditions which negative the element of volition
or criminal intent, probably the best known is that of insanity.
In the case of the grossly insane, the standards of responsibility
seem to be fairly well defined, for as a general rule the law holds
that if the misdoer does not know right from wrong with respect
to his particular act, then he is not to be held accountable for what
he has done.
In a well-known Pennsylvania case, Justice Gibson distinguished
three types or levels of insanity. There is first, he held, a general
insanity which is "so great as entirely to destroy ... perception of
right and wrong. . . It must amount to delusion or hallucination,
controlling his will, and making the commission of the act, in his
apprehension, a duty of overruling necessity." The second level is
that of partial insanity, which is insanity confined to a particular
subject, the misdoer being perfectly sane with regard to all other
subjects. The Justice stated that: "In that species of madness, it
is plain that he is a responsible agent, if he were not instigated by
his madness to perpetrate the act . . ." for "A man whose mind
squints, unless impelled by this very mental obliquity, is as much
amenable to punishment as one whose eye squints . . . The law
is, that whether the insanity be general or partial, the degree of it
must be so great as to have controlled the will of its subject, and
to have taken from him the freedom of moral action."
Finally, Justice Gibson distinguished a third condition which he
labeled "moral or homicidal insanity," whose chief characteristic
is an irresistible inclination to commit a particular offense. He held
that if this condition is habitual-practically second nature-then
the wrongdoer is not to be held responsible, for his mind is under
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coercion and incapable of resistance. This third category, "moral or
homicidal insanity," is evidently synonymous with the present-day
concept, irresistible impulse, or at any rate has become so with
usage.
While the term, irresistible impulse, is now quite common in
both legal and psychiatric literature, there appears to be no clearcut agreement as to its exact meaning. This probably results from
the fact that the expression itself is not a very satisfactory one. An
irresistible impulse literally exists ".... only in the incomprehensible
acts of the confused epileptics, schizophrenics, paralytics and

perhaps in some cases of paranoid attacks
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But the term has

a much more extensive meaning, as we shall see. It is generally
agreed that such an impulse is characterized by a sudden, undeliberated inclination to act. It is also agreed that the impulse
is in most instances capable of being resisted at least up to a
certain point, so that it is irresistible in only a relative sense. In
the common mind, it is believed that the impulse is symptomatic of
insanity, but on this point there is not universal agreement, probably
because the term insanity has no exact meaning, but is a generic
concept whose limits are not definable with any degree of accuracy.
From the writer's point of view, it is serious error to limit the
concept of irresistible impulse to the insanities, for such a limitation
is fictitious and arbitrary, without sound theoretical or factual basis.
Researches have shown that behavior impulses arise from
diverse sources. Endocrinologists, for example, have clearly indicated that there is a definite relationship between glandular
function and behavior. In the so-called normal individual there is
a nice balance among the various endocrines, and the continuation
of this balance seems necessary to the maintenance of an even
emotional keel. Endocrine malfunctioning is soon reflected in overt
behavior. We know, for instance, that over-activity of the thyroid
gland frequently leads to irritability, excitability, and a tendency
to respond quickly to stimuli. And knowing these characteristics
of the hyper-thyroid, we meet the question whether there is a point
at which impulses to act which are of glandular origin, and which
are normally integrated into the personality, become irresistible as
a result of glandular pathology? Researches suggest that this
might be the case, and if it is, then clearly an irresistible impulse
can exist apart from the so-called insanities.
But to observe how relative a concept is the term, irresistible,we
need only to look at one of the normal rhythmical activities of the
body. In a simple experiment in psychology, a female rat is placed
in a revolving cage, and the amount of her daily activity is measured.
Results uniformly show that she becomes more active during the
3Aschaffenburg, Gustav, Psychiatry and Criminal Law, JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 1941, XXXII, p. 5.
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oestrus than at other periods, and one can easily demonstrate the
existence of an activity cycle which is apparently related to the
oestrus cycle. To what extent or degree is this increased activitythis apparent pre-disposition to act-to be termed irresistible?
Further discussion along this line will lead us far afield, for our
purpose in discussing behavior origins and motives has been merely
to indicate that there are obviously many determining forces involved in behavior, and that we need to recognize, in speaking of
impulses as being irresistible, that such impulses are not necessarily
alike, but may develop from different psychological sources. They
may also vary considerably in their characteristics and intensity,
and need not be rooted in insanity, as is so commonly believed. One
must conclude, therefore, that there is no single species of irresistible
impulse; rather, there are impulses of many kinds. In the remainder of this paper, we propose to discuss irresistible impulse in
relation to (1) emotion, (2) psycho-neurosis, and (3) habit.
Emotion
To what extent can behavior resulting from acute emotional
stimulation be said to be irresistible? Sherrington has said that
"Emotion 'moves' us, hence the word itself. If developed in intensity, it impels toward vigorous movement. ''4 And as Cannon has
so well shown, every one of the visceral changes which is part of
fear or pain-". . . the cessation of processes in the alimentary
canal (thus freeing the energy supply for other parts); the
shifting of blood from the abdominal organs to the organs iamediately essential to muscular exertion; the increased vigor of
contraction of the heart; the discharge of extra blood corpuscles
from the spleen; the deeper respiration; the dilation of the bronchioles; the quick abolition of the effects of muscular fatigue; the
mobilizing of sugar in the circulation . . ."-all have an energizing
effect, driving the body toward action.5 In this same vein, Kempf,
in discussing anger, writes that "Anger is the aggressive compensatory reaction that follows more or less promptly and intensely,
the fear reaction, and compels the removal of the stimulus from
the receptor. That is, it compels an attack upon the painful
stimulus."6
But, as we well know, not every person who is thus emotionally stimulated finds a release in an aggressive act, for if this were so,
the incidence of violent crimes would tremendously greater than
is now the case. Fortunately for all of us, we are capable of resisting emotional impulses up to a certain point because our emotions
4 Sherrington, C. S., The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, Yale
University Press (1906), p. 295.
5 Cannon, W. B., Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage, New
York, Appleton-Century Co. (1929), p. 225.
6 Kempf, E. J., Psychopathology, St. Louis, C. V. Mosely Co. (1920), p. 25.
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are under the control of higher brain centers. However, studies
have indicated that there are great individual differences in the
ability to resist emotional stimuli, and that these differences are
related both to the nature of the stimulus and to the degree of
personality integration of the person being stimulated. When this
resistance has been overcome, and the control of the higher
centers of the brain no longer functions, the ensuing behavior is
unpredictable, and the impulse to do a specific act is, for all intents
and purposes, irresistible.
Psychoneuroses
A second and probably the best known form of irresistible
behavior is that encountered in the psychoneuroses, which are
commonly referred to as functional mental disorders. In psychiatric
literature, the psychoneurotic is a common figure, described by a
plethora of adjectives and phrases. He is said to be suggestible,
emotionally unstable, socially inadequate; or perhaps he suffers
from excessive anxiety or tension; or his behavior is stereotyped,
and there is a restriction of spontaneity.
Psychoneurotic symptoms may appear in any one or in any
combination of many forms; but we are especially interested in
those known as obsessions, compulsions, or impulsions. Most of us
have had experience with these, for in their mild manifestations
they are quite common and occur not infrequently in normal
persons, especially as a result of fatigue.
In the true psychoneuroses, the compulsions are frequently
very difficult to control. ". . . impulses appear without cause, the
patient is restless until they are carried out, and their accomplishment is accompanied by a feeling of relief. ' '7 In most instances.the
impulses are capable of being resisted up to a certain point. Freud,
for example, describes the case of a young man. ". . . for whom an
obsessional neurosis made life almost unendurable, so that he
could not go into the streets, because he was tormented by the fear
that he would kill everyone he met."" However, the youth was able
to restrain himself, and Freud reports that psychoanalytic treatment eventually effected a cure.
But sometimes the impulse gets out of hand, and the result is
not so pleasant. Burt tells us that
"Petty compulsive actions are by no means uncommon in young boys. The child
suffers from an uncontrollable impulse to make certain irrational movements-to
count everything he comes across, to touch certain posts or articles of furniture....
At times, the impulse may be a criminal one. Kleptomania, nymphomania, pyromania,
dipsomania, dromomania, homicidal mania, in short, nearly all the so-called criminal
'manias,' prove to be examples . . . of a compulsion neurosis. The offender acts
as if under some spell of magic, and feels himself forced irresistibly to perpetrate
7White, W. A., Outlines of Psychiatry, Washington, Nervous and Mental
Disease Publishing Co. (1929), p. 92.
8 Freud, S., Interpretationof Dreams.
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some useless theft, to wander off on some motiveless tour, to set light to some
gloriously inflammable pile, or even to stab his nearest relation or strangle his
dearest friend... :0

It is probably this form of behavior, the compulsion neurosis,
which the law has in mind when it speaks of irresistible impulse,
perhaps because it seems to partake of the essence of insanity. The
conduct of the psychoneurotic is usually so meaningless, so purposeless, that the law sometimes is willing to excuse it on the
grounds that it was not rational, or was not volitional.
However, we must also bear in mind that even with the removal
of the cause of the neurosis, the symptoms-stealing, arson, sex
promiscuity, and so forth-frequently continue as simple habits or
automatisms; that is, the symptom has become a learned or acquired
trait.1 0
Habit
This fact raises the question whether habit in and of itself may
make certain acts irresistible. It was Dewey who said that "Every
habit is impulsive," and psychologists have long been aware of the
potency of entrenched behavior patterns. James' classical description of habit development still provides food for thought:
"Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its ever so little scar. The
drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson's play, excuses himself for every fresh
dereliction by saying, 'I won't count this time.' Well! he may not count it, and
a kind Heaven may not count it. but it is being counted none the less. Down among
his nerve cells and fibres the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it
up to be used against him when the next temptation comes'1"

We know that subsequent behavior responses are facilitated by
previous practice and experience, and that one who has formed
a tendency to respond to a stimulus in a certain way eventually
establishes an habitual reaction pattern to the appropriate stimulus,
other factors being favorable. Response A comes almost inevitably
to follow stimulus B. This process is well demonstrated in the case
of the habitual forger. Starting on his career by successfully passing
a worthless check, he finds this to be an easy way to make a living
and passes more of them every time he needs money. His forgeries
come to be semi-automatic, almost stereotyped responses, and
continue in spite of repeated incarcerations.
It is important to recognize that criminal habituation need not
involve any question of deep-seated pathology of the personality,
but arises in the same manner as non-criminal habituation. There
is essentially no difference, in so far as psychological processes
are concerned, between learning to be a criminal and learning to
be anything else. Criminologists have long been aware of the
9 Burt, C., The Young Delinquent, New York, Appleton (1931), pp. 560-561.
10 Hollingworth, H. L., The Psychology of FunctionalNeuroses, New York,
Appleton (1920), p. 76.
"1James, W., Psychology, New York, Henry Holt (1892), p. 150.

462

JESS SPIRER

existence of a normal habitual offender who has adjusted to a life
of crime; he is one whose spontaneous responses to a given situation
are criminal in nature. He has become, to quote Dewey, ". . . a
creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct," and no more
able to resist his criminal impulses than can the cigarette smoker
stop smoking.
We have thus seen that it is erroneous to speak of a single kind
of irresistible behavior, although the law arbitrarily does so. It
is evident, also, that there is no readily observable line of demarcation between resistible and irresistible impulses. The courts have
sensed this, and have wavered in their inclinations to accept the
defense of irresistible impulse, for they realize that if they extend
the concept of irrestibility to its limits, they might arrive at a
point where no one can be held responsible for his acts on the
grounds, as Alexander and Staub have put it, that all behavior is
"overdetermined." And yet, the law is reluctant to punish those
who are not responsible for their offenses.
Is there any solution to this problem? Should we free all
criminals on the ground that they were not responsible for their
acts; should we punish indiscriminately on the ground that everyone
is responsible for his deeds? In answering these questions, part of
the difficulty seems to lie in the fact that we think in terms of a
standard of absolute responsibility and cling to it. Men are either
absolutely guilty or absolutely innocent. And, of course, we have
no alternative way of looking at wrongdoers as long as our thinking
is oriented toward punishment and retribution. However, this
type of thinking loses sight of a very important function of the
law, that is, rehabilitation. If we conceive of one of the aims of
law to be rehabilitation of the offender, we need no longer strain
to find excuses for certain classes of individuals whom we wish
to except from punishment, for every person may be held accountable for what he has done, and the disposition of his case will be
made in accordance with an established program. of differential
treatment. The criminal whose act grew out of a neurosis will be
handled one way; the normal habitual offender will receive another
form of treatment; the emotional criminal, perhaps yet another.
The point is, that instead of permitting irresistible impulse as a
defense, the law would hold that the stronger the impulse, the
greater the need for treatment. "Irresistible impulse would be
12
the very antithesis of defense for conviction."'

12 Waite, T. B., 23 Michigan Law Review 452.

